## The Market for Institutions

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 ${\rm April}\ 2019$ 

#### SHARE

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY



# The Clean Water Act actually cleans water

#### **Brad Wible**



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**ENVIRONMENTALISM** 



# Measuring charity

#### Caroline Ash



+ See all authors and affiliations



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


Figure: Ancient Rome



Figure: Bucket Brigades

Soon after the college openedm Frankling moved on to his next project, raising money for a hospital. The public appeal he published in the Gazette, which vivdly described the moral duty people have to help the sick, contained the typical Frankin ringing refrain: "The good particular men may do separately in relieving the sick small compared with what they may do collectively." Raising money was difficul, so he concocted a clever scheme: he got the Assembly to agree that, if  $\tilde{A}\check{c}2,000$  could eb raised privately, it would be matched by Ač2,000 from the public purse. The plan, Franklin recalled, gave people "an additional motive to give, since every man's donation would be doubled."... By coming up with what is now known as the matching grant, Franklin showed how government and private initiative could be woven together, which remains to this day a very American approach. He believe in volunteerism and limited government, but also that there was a ligimate role for government in fostering the common good. By working through public-private partnerships, he felt, governments could have the best impact while avoiding the imposition of too much authority from above.

As a private citizen, he had proposed various civic improvement schemes, such as the library, fire corpos, and police patrol. Now, as a member of the Assembly, he could do even more to be, as he put it, "a great promoter of useful projects." The quintessence of these was his effort to sweep, pave, and light the city streets. The endeavor began when he became bothered by the dust in front of his house, which faced the farmer's market. So he found "a poor industrious man" who was willing to sweep the block for a monthly fee and then wrote a paper that described all the benefits of hiring him. House on the block would remain cleaner, he noted, and shops would attract more customers. He sent the paper around to his neighbors, who all agreed to contribute a portion of the street sweeper's pay each month. The beauty of the scheme was that it opened the way for grander civic improvements. "This raised a general desire to have all the streets paved," Franklin recalled, "and made the people more willing to submit to a tax for that purpose." As a result, Frankling was able to draw up a bill in the Assembly to pay for the street paving, and he accompanied it with a

## Research Questions

- Does institutional substitution exist?
  - ► Yes
- If yes, what causes it?
  - Household demand & inequality
- Does this have welfare implications?
  - Perhaps

## Main Findings

- Conceptual Model on inequality and institutional substitution
  - ▶ Wealth inequality  $\uparrow q_{firm} \uparrow q_{ngo} \uparrow$
  - ▶ Wealth inequality  $\downarrow q_{gov} \uparrow$
- Inequality is correlated with higher levels of nonprofits
- Country and state level correlations on inequality, education, health care and fire fighting are in line with predictions, e.g. higher inequality is correlated with higher levels of private hospitals
- Case Study: Fire Departments

## Conceptual Model

$$U = \left[\underbrace{U(q_{firm})}_{ProductUtility} - \underbrace{C(q_{firm})}_{CostofPurchase}\right] + \left[\underbrace{U(q_{gov})}_{Utility} - \underbrace{C(q_{gov})}_{Taxes}\right] + \left[\underbrace{U(q_{ngo})}_{Utility} - \underbrace{C(q_{ngo})}_{Donation}\right]$$

$$(1)$$

s.t. 
$$\underbrace{p_{firm} * q_{firm}}_{ProductPurchases} + \underbrace{p_{gov} * q_{gov}}_{Taxes} + \underbrace{p_{ngo} * q_{ngo}}_{Donations} = 1$$
 (2)


1

<sup>11)</sup> Private - 28 mil. businesses, 127 mil. employees and 1.5\$ tril. in sales 2) Public - 22 mil. employees and 3.2\$ tril. in tax revenues 3) Non-profit - 12 mil. volunteers and 0.4\$ trillion in donations

## **Predictions**

- 1) max  $\Pi_{firm}(q_{firm}) = TR(q_{firm}) TC(q_{firm})$
- 2) max  $\Pi_{gov}(q_{gov}) = TR(q_{gov}) TC(q_{gov})$
- 3) max  $\Pi_{ngo}(q_{ngo}) = TR(q_{ngo}) TC(q_{ngo})$
- With **high** wealth inequality<sup>2</sup>,  $\rightarrow q_{firm} \uparrow q_{ngo} \uparrow$
- With low wealth inequality,  $\rightarrow q_{gov} \uparrow$

## Charities and Inequality



1990 1995 2000 Year 2005 2010 2015

Number of PFs Top 0.01% Income Share

Figure: Public Charities

Figure: Private Foundations

## Public Charities


	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
VARIABLES	Δ Number of PCs	Δ Number of PCs	$\Delta$ Number of PCs	Δ Number of PCs	Δ Number of PCs	Δ Number of PCs
Income Share of Top .01%						0.310*** (0.119)
Income Share of Top .1%					0.261*** (0.083)	,
Income Share of Top .5%				0.258*** (0.070)		
Income Share of Top 1%			0.242*** (0.071)			
Income Share of Top 5%		0.243*** (0.062)				
Income Share of Top 10%	0.223*** (0.050)					
Observations	78,932	78,932	78,932	78,932	78,932	78,932
R-squared	0.099	0.099	0.099	0.099	0.099	0.098
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## Private Foundations

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
VARIABLES	$\Delta$ Number of PFs	Δ Number of PFs				
Income Share of Top .01%						0.306** (0.145)
Income Share of Top .1%					0.280*** (0.101)	
Income Share of Top .5%				0.260*** (0.084)		
Income Share of Top 1%			0.226*** (0.083)			
Income Share of Top 5%		0.193*** (0.066)	` ′			
Income Share of Top 10%	0.248*** (0.063)	, ,				
Observations	55,167	55,167	55,167	55,167	55,167	55,167
R-squared	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.014
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

## Cross-Country Correlations







Figure: Private Schools

Figure: Public Schools

## Cross-Country Correlations







Figure: Private Health Care

Figure: Public Health Care







Figure: Private Schools

Figure: Public Schools






Figure: Private Hospitals

Figure: Nonprofit Hospitals





Figure: Government Hospitals

Figure: Private Fire Departments







Figure: Volunteer Fire Departments

Figure: Paid Fire Departments

#### Welfare Connection?

# Health and social problems are worse in more unequal countries





**NOVEMBER 19, 2018** 

Kanye West Hired Private Fire Fighters To Save His \$60 Million Mansion

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
VARIABLES	%Private FDs					
Income Share of Top $.01\%$						0.006*** (0.000)
Income Share of Top $.1\%$					0.004*** (0.000)	,
Income Share of Top $.5\%$				0.003*** (0.000)	, ,	
Income Share of Top $1\%$			0.003*** (0.000)	, ,		
Income Share of Top $5\%$		0.004*** (0.000)	, ,			
Income Share of Top $10\%$	0.004*** (0.000)					
Population	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	3,050	3,050	3,050	3,050	3,050	3,050
R-squared	0.032	0.032	0.032	0.032	0.032	0.032
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
VARIABLES	%Volunteer FDs					
Income Share of Top .01%						0.016*** (0.000)
Income Share of Top .1%					0.011*** (0.000)	(* * * * * )
Income Share of Top .5%				0.009*** (0.000)	,	
Income Share of Top 1%			0.009*** (0.000)	, ,		
Income Share of Top 5%		0.010*** (0.000)				
Income Share of Top 10%	0.010*** (0.000)					
Population	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)
Observations	3,050	3,050	3,050	3,050	3,050	3,050
R-squared	0.508	0.508	0.508	0.508	0.508	0.508
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
VARIABLES	$\operatorname{Ln}(\operatorname{Fires})$	$\operatorname{Ln}(\operatorname{Fires})$	$\operatorname{Ln}(\operatorname{Fires})$	$\operatorname{Ln}(\operatorname{Fires})$	$\operatorname{Ln}(\operatorname{Fires})$	Ln(Fires)
Income Share of Top $.01\%$						0.485** (0.219)
Income Share of Top $.1\%$					0.343**	(0.210)
					(0.146)	
Income Share of Top .5%				0.283**		
Income Share of Top $1\%$			0.242** (0.109)	(0.119)		
Income Share of Top $5\%$		0.169* (0.094)	, ,			
Income Share of Top $10\%$	0.111 $(0.077)$	,				
Observations	3,264	3,264	3,264	3,264	3,264	3,264
R-squared	0.100	0.101	0.102	0.102	0.102	0.101
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
VARIABLES	Reported Fires					
Change in Income Share of Top $.01\%$						0.001** (0.001)
Change in Income Share of Top $.1\%$					0.002** (0.001)	(0.00-)
Change in Income Share of Top $.5\%$				0.004** (0.002)	, ,	
Change in Income Share of Top $1\%$			0.006** (0.003)			
Change in Income Share of Top $5\%$		0.018** (0.009)				
Change in Income Share of Top $10\%$	0.044** (0.022)					
2014 County Level Population	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)
Observations	3,073	3,073	3,073	3,073	3,073	3,073
R-squared	0.345	0.345	0.345	0.345	0.345	0.345
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses


\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

VARIABLES	(1) RFs	(2) RFs	(3) RFs	(4) RFs	(5) RFs	(6) RFs	(7) RFs	(8) RFs	(9) RFs	(10) RFs	(11) RFs	(12) RFs
c.Top001_adj#c.volunteer												0.002**
c.Top01_adj#c.volunteer											0.001*	(0.001)
c.Top05_adj#c.volunteer										0.001	(0.001)	
$c. Top1\_adj\#c. volunteer$									0.001	(0.000)		
$c. Top5\_adj\#c. volunteer$								0.000 (0.000)	(0.000)			
$c. Top 10\_adj \#c. volunteer$							0.000	(0.000)				
c.Top001_adj#c.private						-0.002 (0.005)	(0.000)					
c.Top01_adj#c.private					-0.003 (0.003)	(0.000)						
c.Top05_adj#c.private				-0.003 (0.003)	(0.000)							
$c. Top 1\_adj \# c. private$			-0.003 (0.002)	(0.000)								
c. Top5_adj#c.private		-0.004*** (0.001)	( ,									
c.Top10_adj#c.private	-0.004*** (0.001)											
Income Share of Top $10\%$	-0.004*** (0.000)						-0.004*** (0.000)					
%Private FDs	0.157*** (0.051)	0.129*** (0.039)	0.055 (0.035)	(0.038)	0.018 (0.027)	0.003 (0.017)						
Income Share of Top $5\%$		(0.002***						0.001*** (0.000)				
Income Share of Top $1\%$			0.001*** (0.000)						0.000 (0.000)			
Income Share of Top $.5\%$				0.001*** (0.000)						0.000		
Income Share of Top $.1\%$					0.001*** (0.000)						0.000 (0.000)	
Income Share of Top $.01\%$						0.001*** (0.000)						-0.000 (0.001)
%Volunteer FDs							-0.007 (0.022)	-0.008 (0.015)	-0.007 (0.008)	-0.006 (0.008)	-0.004 (0.006)	-0.003 (0.006)
Observations R-squared	3,013 0.350	3,013 0.350	3,013 0.350	3,013 0.350	3,013 0.350	3,013 0.350	3,013 0.352	3,013 0,352	3,013 0,353	3,013 0,353	3,013 0.353	3,013 = 0.353
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

## School Financing

#### SPENDING PER STUDENT, BY SCHOOL DISTRICT

Adjusted for regional differences, for primary and unified school districts



## Thank You